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a b s t r a c t
In this work, a renewable, multi-use, multi-secret sharing scheme for general access
structure based on the one-way collision resistant hash function is presented in which
each participant has to carry only one share. As it applies the collision resistant one-
way hash function, the proposed scheme is secure against conspiracy attacks even if
the pseudo-secret shares are compromised. Moreover, high complexity operations like
modularmultiplication, exponentiation and inversion are avoided to increase its efficiency.
Finally, in the proposed scheme, both the combiner and the participants can verify the
correctness of the information exchanged among themselves.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In recent times, mathematics has been widely used in public-key cryptography, which in turn has been widely used in
various applications such as e-cash, e-voting etc. One of the important issues of the public-key cryptosystem is the key
management and thus the private key of the public-key infrastructure should be safely preserved.
A secret sharing scheme (SSS) allows one to split a secret s into different pieces, called shares, which are given to the
set of participants P such that only certain qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret using their respective
shares. The collection of those qualified sets of participants is called the access structure Γs corresponding to s. Blakley [1]
and Shamir [2], in 1979, independently, came out with a scheme known as the (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme.
Stadler [3] proposed a verifiable secret sharing scheme for general access structure. However, the schemes [1–3] dealt with
a single secret and once the secret was updated to a new one, the system had to reissue a new share to each participant.
This may be considered as system resource consuming and sometimes impracticable. To eliminate these weaknesses, in
1994, He and Dawson [4] proposed a multistage (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. In 2007, Geng et al. [5] proposed a
multi-use threshold secret sharing scheme using the one-way hash function and pointed out that the He–Dawson scheme
was actually a one-time-use scheme and cannot endure conspiring attacks. A SSS is said to bemulti-use if even after a secret
is reconstructed by some participants, the combiner cannot misuse their submitted information to reconstruct some other
secrets. In making a schememulti-use, the participants provide the combiner not with the original share but with a shadow
or image of that share, which is actually an entity that depends on the original share. This image or shadow is known as the
pseudo-secret share. In 2006, Pang et al. [6] proposed a multi-secret sharing scheme for general access structure in which
all the secrets are revealed at one time. In 2008, Wei et al. [7] proposed a renewable secret sharing scheme for general
access structure. The proposed scheme also allows new secrets to be added. In addition, the participant set and the access
structure canbe changeddynamicallywithout updating anyparticipant’s share. A SSS is said to be verifiable if the participants
can check the correctness of their shares given by the dealer and the reconstructed secret given by the combiner, and
the combiner can check whether the participants have submitted the correct pseudo-shares or not. The proposed scheme
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is a verifiable, multi-secret sharing scheme where each secret can be reconstructed independently and different secrets
corresponding to different access structures may be shared. The uses of only ‘XOR’ operation and the hash function make
the scheme efficient compared to the schemes [2,3] which use modular multiplication, exponentiation and inversion.
The rest of this work is organized as follows: The proposed scheme is discussed in Section 2. The analysis and discussion
of the proposed scheme are given in Section 3 and finally, the conclusion is given in Section 4.
2. The proposed scheme
In this section, we present a new efficient, renewable, multi-usemulti-secret sharing scheme for general access structure
using the one-way collision resistant hash function [8].
The aim of the scheme:
Suppose,P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be a set of n participants and s1, s2, . . . , sk be the k secrets to be shared by a trusted dealer
D such that si ∈ {0, 1}q for i = 1, 2, . . . , k with access structures Γsi = {Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aiti} where {0, 1}q denotes the set of
all binary strings of fixed length q and Ail is the lth qualified subset of the access structure of the ith secret si.
The scheme consists of three basic phases:
The dealer’s phase
Step 1: The dealerD chooses:
(i) H , a suitable secure collision resistant one-way hash function, which takes as argument a binary string of arbitrary
length and produces as output a binary string of a fixed length q, where q is the length of each secret. (ii) xα ∈R{0, 1}q,
α = 1, 2, . . . , n, where ‘∈R’ denotes the random selection.
Step 2: The dealer D sends xα to Pα secretly, for α = 1, 2, . . . , n, and publishes H and the access structures Γsi , for i =
1, 2, . . . , k. The selection of xα in (ii) of Step 1 may also be done by the participants and they themselves may send their
shares to the dealer through a secure channel.
The pseudo-share generation phase
Let l = [log2 k] + 1 and m = [log2 t] + 1, where t = max{t1, t2, . . . , tk} and ti = |Γsi |, as explained in The aim of the
scheme.
Step 1: For i = 1, 2, . . . , k; j = 1, 2, . . . , ti, the dealer computes
Sij = si
⊕ ⊕
α:Pα∈Aij
H(xα‖il‖jm)

where il denotes the l-bit binary representation of i, jm denotes the m-bit binary representation of j, ‘‖’ denotes the
concatenation of two binary strings and
⊕
denotes the XOR operation, i.e., componentwise addition modulo 2.
Step 2: D publishes the values Sij,H(si),H2(xα‖il‖jm) for α = 1, 2, . . . , n; i = 1, 2, . . . , k; j = 1, 2, . . . , ti, where
H2(xα‖il‖jm)means H(H(xα‖il‖jm)).
The combiner’s phase
Suppose the group of participants Aij of Γsi submit their shares to the combiner to get si. Then the combiner can check
whether a particular participant has given his or her pseudo-secret share H(xα‖il‖jm) correctly or not, by verifying it with
the corresponding public value H2(xα‖il‖jm).
If each of the pseudo-secret shares is correct, the combiner C calculates
Sij
⊕ ⊕
α:Pα∈Aij
H(xα‖il‖jm)

which is eventually equal to si.
The participants in Aij of Γsi can check whether the combiner is giving them back the correct secret si or not, by verifying
it with the public value H(si).
3. Analysis of the scheme
3.1. Security of the scheme
We discuss the security of the scheme with respect to the pseudo-secret shares, the shares and the secrets.
1. Security of the pseudo-secret shares: An adversary A can try to derive a participant’s pseudo-secret share from
H2(xα‖il‖jm), which is public. But if A succeeds in doing that, then A will be able to find a pre-image of an element under
H , which is assumed to be computationally hard.
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Table 1
Comparison among [6,7] and the proposed scheme w.r.t. various parameters.
Features Proposed Scheme Pang et al. [6] Wei et al. [7]
Multi-secret Yes Yes Yes
Access structure General General General
Secret revealing order Any Predetermined (all at a time) Predetermined (fixed order)
Use of interpolation No Yes Yes
Use of modular exponentiation No No Yes
Use of hash/one-way function Yes (hash function) Yes (hash function) No (DLP is used)
2. Security of the shares: An adversaryA can try to derive a participant’s share from a previously submitted pseudo-secret
shareH(xα‖il‖jm). But as the shares are chosen by the dealer randomly and passed on to the respective participants secretly,
adversaryAwould have to invert the hash function H , which is assumed to be computationally hard.
3. Security of the secrets: Suppose all but one participant in Aij comes to get si. They have to guess the pseudo-secret share
of themissing participant from {0, 1}q, where q is the fixed bit-length of the hashed value. So, they have 2q choices.Whereas,
a layman, without any share, who knows only that the secret si is a q-bit string, has also 2qmany choices for the secret. Thus,
a forbidden set of participants has no extra privilege as compared with an outsider. The same thing happens if any other
unauthorised subset of participants comes to reconstruct any secret. Thus, the scheme is computationally secure under the
security of the chosen collision resistant hash function H .
Remark. Note that, in the proposed scheme, the size of the secret space is same as that of the share space.
3.2. The scheme is a multi-use one
Suppose a participant Pα submits his or her pseudo-secret share to the combiner for the reconstruction of a particular
secret si. Again, let the same participant Pα be present in the access structure Γsj , i 6= j. If his or her pseudo-secret shares are
the same in the two cases, then the combiner maymisuse his or her share without consent while reconstructing sj. Thus, the
pseudo-secret shares of a participant for different secrets and even for different qualified subsets for the same secret should
be different.
Various schemes (see, e.g., [4,5,9]) incorporate successive use of hash functions to deal with this situation, which
contribute to greater complexities of the schemes. In the present scheme, that bottleneck is removed by the use of
concatenation of binary strings of i and j to xα and as a result, it is sufficient to use the hash function only once.
3.3. Renewal of the scheme
In a practical scenario, it may be necessary to add new secrets and corresponding access structure. In addition, it may be
required to change the participant set or the access structure corresponding to some secret(s).
In the proposed scheme, these changes can be done dynamically without updating any participant’s share. This can be
achieved by the dealer by simply modifying the pubic values S ′ij and Γs′i = {A′i1, A′i2, . . . , A′iti}, where s′i is the added secret
and/or Γs′i is the modified access structure.
3.4. Performance analysis
The present scheme is an efficient one for the following reasons:
(1) The only operations that are used are XOR and finding the hashed values, of which the former is of negligible complexity.
As the hash function plays an important role in the proposed scheme, we calculate the number of times that the hash
function, H , is used by each of the participants, the dealer and the combiner for a single secret si in the worst possible case.
By the dealer: nt times for calculating Sij, nt times for calculating H2(xα‖il‖jm) and once for publishing H(si)—in total
2nt + 1 times.
By each participant: Once for calculating H(xα‖il‖jm) and once for verifying H(si).
By the combiner: n times for checking the correctness of the submitted pseudo-secret shares by calculatingH2(xα‖il‖jm).
(2) In [4,5,9], successive use of the hash function is incorporated to use the same share more than once, but in the present
work, the same issue is resolved just by using the hash function only once.
(3) In the present scheme, modular exponentiation, modular multiplication and modular inversion are not used anywhere,
in contrast to the case for various schemes where some of them (see, e.g., [3,7]) used modular exponentiation and others
(see, e.g., [2,6,7]) used Lagrange interpolation techniques for the reconstruction of secrets. So, the computational cost in the
present scheme is quite low compared to those of other schemes using the above-mentioned operations.
The earlier schemes [6,7] also have almost the same features as the proposed scheme. We give a brief comparison of the
earlier two schemes with the proposed one in Table 1.
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3.5. Comments on dealer verification
In reality, the dealer should also be verifiable as, due to dishonesty of the dealer, some/all of the participants may be
deprived from reconstructing the original secret or secrets. For dealing with this crisis, there are many schemes [3,10,11,6]
in the present literature which allow dealer verification.
In most of the existing schemes allowing dealer verification, the issue of verification has been dealt with using
exponentiation (say, to the base g , where g is a primitive element of the underlying group; see, e.g., [3,10,11]) or by applying
a one-way hash function (say H; see, e.g., [6]) to the secret shares. Let us have a look at the issue from a broader platform:
suppose x is the share of a participant given by the dealer. In the above stated schemes, the dealer either publishes H(x) or
gx to enable the participants to verify their own shares. Now, three cases may arise.
Case 1: Suppose the dealer calculates, instead of x, relevant quantities, and constructs the scheme using x′, and sends
x (x 6= x′) as the share and publishes H(x) (or gx). Then, though the participant will be assured that his or her share is
valid by checking the verification procedure, the qualified set where he or she belongs will not get the correct secret back.
Thus, the dealer can forge a participant without being noticed. So, in reality, the dealer is not verified using these methods.
Case 2: In another scenario (see, e.g., [12]), where the participants choose their share x themselves and send it to the dealer,
the same problem may arise.
Case 3: In the worst case, it may happen that the dealer publishes the wrong entities, like the hash functionH or the prime p,
which are involved in the initial set-up of the scheme. In that case, the total system will collapse. How can these quantities
be checked to be correct or not?
So, in our scheme,we assume the dealerD to be a trusted one. But itwould be aworthwhile issue to search for techniques
which resolve the aforesaid problems and we invite researchers to have a look at this.
4. Conclusion
In this work, we have presented a multi-secret sharing scheme with general access structures based on a one-way
collision resistant hash function. The major characteristics of its construction are multi-use of the shares and that different
secrets can be reconstructed according to their access structure, which provides more flexibility. It has been emphasised
that, unlike in several other schemes, operations like modular multiplication, exponentiation and inversion are not used,
thereby reducing the computational cost of the scheme to quite a large extent. As it applies a one-way hash function and
the concatenation operation, the proposed scheme is secure against notorious conspiracy attacks even if the pseudo-secret
shares are compromised. Analysis showed that this proposed scheme is an efficient one and it can provide great capabilities
for many applications, such as e-voting, multi-party protocols, oblivious transfer, privacy preserving data-mining etc.
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